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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




We are asked to determine whether the appellant, 
Michael Anthony Adams, is entitled to resentencing 
because the District Court failed to observe the r equirement 
of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(C), which 
mandates that the District Court personally addr ess the 
defendant before imposing sentence and deter mine whether 
he wishes to make a statement or present any information 
in mitigation of the sentence. We conclude that Adams 
should be resentenced, and accordingly will vacate the 
judgment of the District Court and remand for 
resentencing. 
 
We note that Adams also seeks resentencing on the basis 
of the District Court's alleged failure to verify that Adams 
and his defense counsel had read and discussed the 
presentence report, as requir ed under subsection (A) of the 
same Rule. However, the resentencing r emedy which we 
afford Adams based upon subsection (C) obviates the need 
to decide that issue. Also, we will not reach the third issue 
raised on appeal, namely, whether the District Court 
properly refused to grant a downwar d departure from the 
Sentencing Guidelines range, because we lack jurisdiction 
over this issue.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Adams contends that the District Court misappr ehended its authority 
to depart from the Guidelines range based upon substandard 
presentence confinement conditions. Having carefully reviewed the 
record, we conclude that the District Court did understand its authority 
but declined to exercise its discretion to depart downward, and thus we 
do not have jurisdiction to review this aspect of Adams' sentence. E.g., 
United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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II. Facts and Procedural Background  
 
Adams pled guilty to two counts of bank robbery. At the 
sentencing hearing, his counsel voiced several objections to 
the presentence report. He objected to a two-level upward 
adjustment recommended by the report based upon a 
threat that Adams had made towards a bank teller during 
one of the robberies. He further challenged the assessment 
of eleven criminal history points (which established a 
criminal history category of V) as over-r epresenting Adams' 
criminal activity, and sought a downward departure based 
upon substandard confinement conditions. In addition, he 
objected to the inclusion in the presentence r eport of 
information relating to Adams' suspected involvement in 
three other bank robberies that wer e not charged. Finally, 
he challenged the restitution amount recommended in the 
report. 
 
The District Court sustained the objection to the 
information in the presentence report as to Adams' 
suspected involvement in other bank robberies, but 
otherwise overruled the objections and denied the motion 
for a downward departure. After some discussion, the 
District Court asked, "Anything else?" Adams' counsel 
replied, "Do you want to hear me as far as sentencing is 
concerned?" The District Court responded, "I want to hear 
what you want to say about that, of course. And then I 
want to hear if the remorseful defendant has anything he 
wants to say." App., Vol. II, at 111a. 
 
The District Court heard argument both fr om defense 
counsel and the government with respect to sentencing and 
next inquired of Adams' counsel: "Okay. W ould your client 
like to exercise his right of allocution?" After a pause, 
Adams' counsel replied, "No." Id. at 113a. Adams' counsel 
did not object to the District Court's failur e to address 
Adams personally to inquire if he wished to make a 
statement on his own behalf. The District Court then 
imposed a sentence of 105 months, well within the 
Sentencing Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months (which 
corresponded to an offense level of 24 and a criminal 
history of V). Id. at 111-13a. Finally, the District Court 
entertained a recommendation as to the place of service of 
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sentence and advised Adams personally with r espect to his 
right to appeal. Id. at 115-16a. 
 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to both 28 
U.S.C. S 1291, which provides for r eview of final decisions 
of the district courts, and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a)(1), which 
provides for review of final sentences allegedly imposed in 
violation of law. 
 
Because Adams did not raise an objection at his 
sentencing hearing, we review the District Court's failure to 
comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedur e 32(c)(3)(C) 
for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (stating that 
"[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be 
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court"); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 
(1997) (explaining that when no objection is made in the 
district court, the plain error standar d of Rule 52(b) 
governs all direct appeals from judgments of conviction in 





Adams contends that the District Court's failur e to 
comply with its affirmative duty to personally address him 
requires that he be resentenced. The government, on the 
other hand, argues that resentencing is not required 
because Adams demonstrates no prejudice fr om the District 
Court's oversight, and thus there was no plain error under 
Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pr ocedure. 
 
As an initial matter, we note that the parties agree that 
the District Court failed to comply with Rule 32(c)(3)(C), 
which safeguards the defendant's right of allocution. The 
Rule states that, prior to imposing sentence, the district 
court must "address the defendant personally and 
determine whether the defendant wishes to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
the sentence." The District Court was obviously aware of 
Adams' right of allocution, and specifically asked Adams' 
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counsel: "Would your client like to exer cise his right of 
allocution?" However, the Supreme Court has held that this 
query, directed towards counsel, does not satisfy the 
requirement that the district court personally address the 
defendant himself. E.g., Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 
301, 305 (1961) (plurality opinion); id. at 307 (Black, J., 
dissenting); see also United States v. Allegrucci, 299 F.2d 
811, 815 (3d Cir. 1962). Accordingly, the District Court 
erred, and thus we are squarely pr esented with the 
question whether a violation of the right of allocution 
contained in Rule 32(c)(3)(C) necessitates a r emand for 
resentencing. 
 
In addressing the issue before us, we do not write on a 
clean slate. At the same time, the writing that is currently 
on the slate is not particularly clear: ther e are old markings 
still visible along with the new ones, and we will attempt to 
reconcile the two. A historical perspective is in order. 
 
In 1961 and 1962, the Supreme Court issued thr ee 
opinions that characterized the right of allocution as an 
important safeguard that should be strictly enforced 
according to its terms. In Gr een v. United States, 365 U.S. 
301 (1961), the Justices could not have expr essed more 
clearly their view that the right of allocution under Rule 32 
is highly respected. At the conclusion of sentencing, the 
trial judge had asked, "Did you want to say something?" Id. 
at 302. It was unclear from the recor d whether this 
question had been posed to the defendant, or mer ely to 
defense counsel. Id. at 304-05. Given this uncertainty, a 
plurality of the Court determined that the defendant had 
failed to meet his burden of showing that he was not 
accorded his right of allocution. Id. at 305. However, eight 
of the Justices agreed that, in the futur e, trial judges 
should "unambiguously address themselves to the 
defendant" and thus "leave no room for doubt that the 
defendant has been issued a personal invitation to speak 
prior to sentencing."2  Id.; id. at 309 (Black, J., dissenting). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In fashioning this requirement, the Green Court interpreted Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a), which at the time simply stated that 
"[b]efore imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any 
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Justice Frankfurter, writing for the four -Justice plurality, 
eloquently described why the right of allocution is held in 
high esteem: 
 
       The design of Rule 32(a) did not begin with its 
       promulgation; its legal provenance was the common- 
       law right of allocution. As early as 1689, it was 
       recognized that the court's failure to ask the defendant 
       if he had anything to say before sentence was imposed 
       required reversal. See Anonymous, 3 Mod. 265, 266, 87 
       Eng. Rep. 175 (K.B.). Taken in the context of its 
       history, there can be little doubt that the drafters of 
       Rule 32(a) intended that the defendant be personally 
       afforded the opportunity to speak befor e imposition of 
       sentence. We are not unmindful of the r elevant major 
       changes that have evolved in criminal procedur e since 
       the seventeenth century-- the sharp decrease in the 
       number of crimes which were punishable by death, the 
       right of the defendant to testify on his own behalf, and 
       the right to counsel. But we see no reason why a 
       procedural rule should be limited to the cir cumstances 
       under which it arose if reasons for the right it protects 
       remain. None of these modern innovations lessens the 
       need for the defendant, personally, to have the 
       opportunity to present to the court his plea in 
       mitigation. The most persuasive counsel may not be 
       able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, 
       with halting eloquence, speak for himself. W e are 
       buttressed in this conclusion by the fact that the rule 
       explicitly affords the defendant two rights: "to make a 
       statement in his own behalf," and "to pr esent any 
       information in mitigation of punishment." W e therefore 
       reject the Government's contention that merely 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
information in mitigation of punishment." Green, 365 U.S. at 303 n.1. As 
a result of Green, Rule 32 was amended in 1966 to include the direction 
that the court address the defendant personally and ask if he wishes to 
make a statement. See Fed. R. Crim. P . 32 advisory committee's note to 
1966 Amendment; see also United States v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 
1255-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (discussing the development of Rule 32). The 
current Rule 32(c)(3)(C), which is the subject of Adams' appeal, contains 
this requirement that the court personally address the defendant. 
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       affording defendant's counsel the opportunity to speak 
       fulfills the dual role of Rule 32(a). 
 
Green, 365 U.S. at 304. 
 
Justice Black in dissent, joined by three Justices, wrote 
even more forcefully in support of the right of allocution, as 
he took issue with the Court's decision not to grant the 
defendant relief: 
 
       The language of Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER'S opinion 
       does not jibe with the harsh result reached in refusing 
       to accord to petitioner the benefit of Rule 32(a). As he 
       points out, that Rule embodies the practice of the 
       English-speaking world for three centuries or more, 
       based as he properly says upon the belief that,"The 
       most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for 
       a defendant as the defendant might, with halting 
       eloquence, speak for himself." A rule so highly prized 
       for so sound a reason for so long a time deserves to be 
       rigorously enforced by this Court, not mer ely praised in 
       resounding glittering generalities calculated to soften 
       the blow of nonenforcement. 
 
Id. at 311 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 
One year later, in Hill v. United States , 368 U.S. 424 
(1962), the Supreme Court again bolster ed the right of 
allocution, while at the same time limiting its r each. The 
Court reinforced the right by explaining in a footnote that 
the appropriate remedy on direct appeal for a trial court's 
failure to honor the right of allocution in Rule 32 is set 
forth in Van Hook v. United States, 365 U.S. 609 (1961). 
Hill, 368 U.S. at 429 n.6. Van Hook , in turn, is a one- 
sentence opinion that cites Green as requiring reversal and 
remand of defendant Van Hook's case for resentencing. Van 
Hook, 365 U.S. at 609. Consequently, Hill  appears to stand 
for the proposition that, on direct appeal, a defendant is 
automatically entitled to resentencing if the trial court 
violates the defendant's right of allocution by, for example, 
failing to personally address him prior to sentencing. 
 
At the same time, the Hill Court limited the right of 
allocution by holding that violations of the right could not 
be redressed by way of a habeas corpus petition, absent 
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aggravating circumstances. Hill, 368 U.S. at 428-29. If the 
trial court simply failed to comply with "the for mal 
requirements of the Rule" by, for example, neglecting to 
personally address the defendant prior to sentencing, then 
habeas relief would be inappropriate. Id. at 429. In 
declining to recognize such a violation as a basis for habeas 
relief, the Court expounded on the natur e of the right of 
allocution: 
 
       The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant 
       represented by an attorney whether he has anything to 
       say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an error 
       of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ 
       of habeas corpus. It is an error which is neither 
       jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a 
       fundamental defect that inherently results in a 
       complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission 
       inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 
       procedure. It does not present "exceptional 
       circumstances where the need for the r emedy afforded 
       by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent." 
 
Id. at 428. 
 
It is noteworthy that Green, V an Hook, and Hill contain 
no mention of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedur e 52. Rule 
52, which has remained unchanged since its adoption in 
1944 and was intended as a restatement of existing law, 
see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 advisory committee notes, sets forth 
the concepts of harmless error and plain error on direct 
review in the federal appellate courts. Rule 52 provides: 
 
       (a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or 
       variance which does not affect substantial rights shall 
       be disregarded. 
 
       (b) Plain Error. Plain err ors or defects affecting 
       substantial rights may be noticed although they wer e 
       not brought to the attention of the court. 
 
Therefore, the over-arching consideration of Rule 52 is 
whether an error "affects substantial rights." In practice, 
Rule 52(a) applies when the defendant has made a timely 
objection to an error, and the court of appeals normally 
engages in a so-called "harmless err or" inquiry to determine 
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whether the error was prejudicial to the defendant, with the 
government bearing the burden of persuasion on the issue 
of prejudice. E.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 
(1993) (discussing the application of Rule 52). When the 
defendant has not objected in the district court, Rule 52(b) 
applies, which normally requires the same kind of inquiry 
as that dictated by Rule 52(a), with one crucial dif ference: 
it is the defendant rather than the government who bears 
the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. Id. Yet 
the Supreme Court's omission of any refer ence to Rule 52 
in Green, Van Hook, orHill is curious, perhaps reflecting its 
belief (at least at that time) that the Rule did not apply to 
violations of the right of allocution on dir ect appeal, and 
thus the appropriate remedy for such violations was 
automatic resentencing. 
 
In sum, from our review of Green, Van Hook, and Hill, we 
conclude that in deciding these cases nearly four decades 
ago, the Supreme Court was of the view that a sentence 
imposed without the trial court's having personally afforded 
the defendant the right of allocution was gr ounds for 
remand for resentencing on direct appeal. And while the 
right of allocution is deeply rooted in our legal tradition and 
highly respected, nonetheless it is neither constitutional 
nor jurisdictional, and thus the defendant faced a difficult 
time in collaterally attacking his sentence based on a 
violation of this right. 
 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that in United States v. 
Allegrucci, 229 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1962), we remanded for 
resentencing after the district court had failed to personally 
address the defendant prior to sentencing and inquire if he 
wished to make a statement. Id. at 815. Before sentencing 
the defendant, the trial court had simply told defendant's 
counsel to "go ahead," which clearly did not measure up to 
the standard enunciated in Green. Id. Following Green, we 
automatically vacated and remanded for r esentencing 
without any discussion of harmless err or, plain error, or 
prejudice to the defendant. Id. 
 
Since its decision in Hill in 1962, the Supr eme Court has 
said little regarding the right of allocution,3 but the federal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Court has mentioned the right four times in passing. Groppi v. 
Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 501 (1972); United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 
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courts have been quite active in interpreting this right and 
in fashioning various tests for determining on direct appeal 
when a violation of the right should result in resentencing.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
165 (1963); Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 336-37 (1963); 
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489 (1962). In addition, the 
Court discussed the right in some detail in McGautha v. California, 402 
U.S. 183 (1971), but did little more than r epeat what had already been 
said in Green and Hill. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 217-20; id. at 228 n.7, 
236-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 
4. We detect at least five differ ent tests that have gained favor in our 
sister circuit courts of appeal. Some courts have resolutely clung to the 
idea that when the right of allocution is violated, the defendant on 
direct 
appeal is always entitled to remand for r esentencing. E.g., United States 
v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 463-65 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Walker, 
896 F.2d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 1990). On the opposite end of the spectrum 
are those courts that hold that the defendant is not entitled to 
resentencing unless he can identify specific statements on appeal that he 
would have made at sentencing that likely would have changed the trial 
court's determination of his sentence. E.g., United States v. Leasure, 122 
F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1997). Several others have concluded that 
resentencing is not required if the defendant has already received the 
lowest possible sentence -- i.e., if he was sentenced at the bottom of the 
applicable Sentencing Guidelines range and he had not argued in the 
trial court that the Guidelines range was incorr ect (by, for example, 
moving for a downward departure or a decr ease in either the offense- 
level or criminal history category, or by ar guing against an upward 
departure or an increase in the of fense-level or criminal history 
category). E.g., United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 627 (6th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Lewis, 10 F.3d 1086, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Mejia, 953 F.2d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 1992). Similarly, some 
courts have fashioned a test that, on the sur face, appears to hold that 
resentencing is not necessary if the defendant has already received the 
lowest possible sentence. However, in r eality this particular test always 
dictates resentencing because these courts have engaged in open-ended 
speculation about what grounds for a lesser sentence the defendant 
might have argued to the court during his allocution had he been given 
the opportunity, even if such grounds had not been raised at any other 
point in the litigation. E.g., United States v. Medrano, 5 F.3d 1214, 1219 
(9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Cole, 27 F.3d 996, 999 (4th 
Cir. 
1994) (remanding for resentencing based on speculation about what 
legal grounds the defendant might have raised during his allocution, 
even though he apparently did not argue such grounds on appeal). Still 
others have adopted the rather vague standar d that resentencing is 
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The catalyst behind much of this activity is that in the 
years following Green, Van Hook, and Hill, the Supreme 
Court has increasingly considered the concepts of harmless 
error and plain error, set forth in Rule 52, as necessary 
inquiries on direct appeal whenever a defendant alleges 
that his rights were violated in the district court. (In this 
appeal, we are, of course, specifically concerned with the 
concept of plain error -- as opposed to har mless error -- 
because Adams did not raise an objection in the District 
Court). This emphasis on Rule 52 leads us to question 
whether we should reassess the seemingly simple directive 
of Green, Van Hook, and Hill (and Allegrucci) that on direct 
appeal the defendant is automatically entitled to 
resentencing when he is not affor ded his right of allocution. 
We think that such a reexamination is appropriate. 
 
As noted above, Rule 52(b) was adopted in 1944 and sets 
forth the standard for plain error r eview. Although Rule 
52(b) apparently did nothing more than codify the standard 
laid down by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936), see United States v. 
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985), nevertheless it was unclear, at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
appropriate only if failure to do so would result in "manifest injustice." 
E.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Velasquez, 132 F.3d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
 
Adding to the complexity of these various standar ds is the 
circumstance that sometimes a single court has adopted more than one 
test, without acknowledging the conflict. This situation is perhaps the 
most pronounced in the Ninth Circuit. Compare Leasure, 122 F.3d at 
841 (holding resentencing inappropriate unless the defendant can 
identify specific statements on appeal that he would have made at 
sentencing that likely would have impacted his sentence) and Mejia, 953 
F.2d at 468 (holding resentencing not warranted if the defendant already 
received the lowest possible sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines) 
with Medrano, 5 F.3d at 1219 (adopting a rule that in practice requires 
automatic resentencing, because even though the defendant in the trial 
court had raised no grounds for a lower sentence, the court nevertheless 
remanded for resentencing based on speculation about what the 
defendant might have said during allocution had he been given the 
chance) and United States v. Navarro-Flor es, 628 F.2d 1178, 1184 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (automatically remanding for resentencing when the right of 
allocution is violated). 
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least until recently, whether on direct appeal Rule 52(b) 
should apply to every conceivable err or to which the 
defendant failed to object, or whether a class of rights 
existed whose violation was considered so serious that Rule 
52(b) should be bypassed in favor of automatic r eversal. As 
explained above, Green, V an Hook, and Hill would appear to 
place the right of allocution within this pr oposed class, 
because none of these opinions even mentions Rule 52 at 
all. 
 
However, in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), 
the Supreme Court strongly indicated that no such class of 
rights exists. The Court first observed that "[n]o procedural 
principle is more familiar . . . than that a constitutional 
right, or a right of any other sort, may be for feited in 
criminal as well as civil cases by the failur e to make timely 
assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction 
to determine it." Id. at 731 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 
321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). In a criminal matter, the Court continued, 
"Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which governs 
on appeal from criminal proceedings, pr ovides a court of 
appeals a limited power to correct [for feited] errors." Id. The 
Court then strongly suggested that all for feited errors in a 
criminal proceeding are subject to Rule 52(b) analysis when 
it stated broadly that "[i]f a legal rule was violated during 
the district court proceedings, and if the defendant did not 
waive the rule, then there has been an `err or' within the 
meaning of Rule 52(b) despite the absence of a timely 
objection." Id. at 733-34. In making this determination, the 
Court carefully differentiated between waiver and forfeiture: 
waiver is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right," while forfeiture is the "failure to make 
the timely assertion of a right," or in other wor ds, the 
failure to object to an alleged violation. Id. at 733. 
 
If, in the wake of Olano, there wer e any doubt about the 
universal applicability of Rule 52(b) on dir ect appeal of a 
criminal conviction when no objection was raised in the 
district court, this doubt was erased by Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997). In Johnson, the defendant 
argued that the constitutional error in her trial proceedings, 
to which she had not objected, was so serious that Rule 
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52(b) did not apply, and thus she was entitled to automatic 
reversal. Id. at 466. The Court flatly rejected that argument, 
specifically stating that "the seriousness of the error 
claimed does not remove consideration of it fr om the ambit 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedur e." Id. Moreover, 
the Court continued, Rule 52 "by its terms governs direct 
appeals from judgments of conviction in the federal system, 
and therefore governs this case." Id. Consequently, the 
Court had "no authority" to carve out an exception to Rule 
52(b) based simply on the gravity of the char ged error. Id. 
 
Thus we are compelled to arrive at the conclusion that 
Adams' claim of error is subject to Rule 52(b) plain error 
analysis.5 As such, Olano provides the proper framework for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It is also worth noting that had Adams raised an objection in the 
District Court, he still would not be entitled to automatic reversal, but 
instead his claim would be subject to Rule 52(a) har mless error review. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson (even though it dealt with plain 
error and not harmless error) says as much when it explains, as noted 
above, that Rule 52 "by its terms gover ns direct appeals from judgments 
of conviction in the federal system." Johnson , 520 U.S. at 466. More 
specifically, the Court has repeatedly declar ed that Rule 52(a) harmless 
error inquiry applies whenever the defendant has raised an objection in 
the district court. E.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) 
(stating that Rule 52(a) "by its terms applies to all errors where a 
proper 
objection is made at trial") (emphasis in original); Bank of Nova Scotia 
v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (applying Rule 52(a) harmless 
error review to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, and observing that 
"[i]t follows that Rule 52 is, in every pertinent respect, as binding as 
any 
statute duly enacted by Congress, and federal courts have no more 
discretion to disregard the Rule's mandate than they do to disregard 
constitutional or statutory provisions"); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 
438, 448 n.11 (1986) (rejecting the notion that Rule 52(a) can be 
selectively applied, explaining that "on its face, Rule 52(a) admits of no 
broad exceptions to its applicability. Any assumption that once a 
`substantial right' is implicated it is inher ently `affected' by any 
error 
begs the question raised by Rule 52(a)"). The only exception to the 
applicability of harmless error r eview is in the "very limited class" of 
"structural" constitutional errors that"infect the entire trial process" 
and 
therefore are so serious that they can never be deemed harmless. E.g., 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (describing the class of structural constitutional 
errors, which includes complete denial of counsel, a biased trial judge, 
racial discrimination in selection of a grand jury, denial of self- 
representation at trial, denial of a public trial, and a defective 
reasonable-doubt jury instruction). 
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analyzing Adams' claim. Before we can grant Adams relief, 
the District Court must have committed (1) "err or" (2) that 
is "plain" (3) that "affect[s] substantial rights." Olano, 507 
U.S. at 732. If all three of these conditions are met, we 
"ha[ve] [the] authority to" corr ect the District Court, "but 
[we are] not required to do so," because Olano makes clear 
that we should exercise our discretion to correct the error 
only if it "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at 735-36. This 
involves an examination of the seriousness of the error in 
the context of the entire case. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469; 
see also Young, 470 U.S. at 15-16 (explaining that 
reviewing courts must assess an alleged err or "against the 
entire record" so as to deter mine whether such error 
"seriously affect[s] the fair ness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings"). 
 
Normally, in order for an error to"affect substantial 
rights" under the third prong of the Olano test, the error 
must have been "prejudicial" -- in other words, "[i]t must 
have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings." 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. It is the defendant who bears the 
burden of persuasion with respect to pr ejudice. Id. 
However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that some 
errors to which no objection was made should be 
"presumed prejudicial" if the defendant cannot make a 
specific showing of prejudice. Id. at 735. Furthermore, 
there may be a special category of forfeited errors that can 
be corrected "regardless of their effect on the outcome."6 
Id. 
 
Notwithstanding this guidance, the federal cir cuit courts 
of appeal have been inconsistent in their application of 
Olano when reviewing violations of the right of allocution on 
direct appeal to which no objection was raised in the 
district court.7 As explained above, in our view, a fair 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Here, the Court is apparently r eferring to "structural" constitutional 
errors. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468-69. 
 
7. For example, some courts have applied har mless error -- rather than 
plain error -- review, even when no objection was raised in the district 
court. E.g., United States v. Patterson, 128 F.3d 1259, 1260-61 (8th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Carper, 24 F .3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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reading of Olano dictates that when a defendant fails to 
object to a violation of his right of allocution, his claim on 
appeal is reviewed for plain error -- which requires the 
defendant to make a specific showing of pr ejudice,8 unless 
he can show that the error should be pr esumed prejudicial, 
or that the error belongs in a special category of errors that 
should be corrected regardless of pr ejudice (i.e., the 
category of structural errors). 
 
We recently had the opportunity to addr ess a violation of 
the right of allocution in United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 
140 (3d Cir. 2000). Following the lead of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. 
Lewis, 10 F.3d 1086 (4th Cir. 1993), we held that "even 
were we to assume that [the defendant] was denied the 
right of allocution," he was not entitled to automatic 
resentencing because he was not prejudiced by the denial 
in light of the fact that "he was sentenced to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Others have cited the Olano plain err or framework, but have 
implemented it in a curious fashion by ostensibly placing the burden of 
proving prejudice on the defendant, yet in fact implicitly presuming 
prejudice whenever the defendant did not r eceive the lowest possible 
sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. E.g. , United States v. Cole, 27 
F.3d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1994). Still others appear to have ignored Olano 
altogether. E.g., United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 462-64 (5th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Rodriguez-Velasquez, 132 F.3d 698, 700 (11th 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Alba Pagan, 33 F .3d 125, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Maldonado, 996 F.2d 598, 599 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 
8. Surprisingly, our research r eveals that only two opinions in the 
federal 
courts of appeal, neither of which is a majority opinion, appear to 
implement the Olano framework in this manner by placing the burden of 
demonstrating prejudice on the defendant. Myers, 150 F.3d at 465-67 
(Davis, J., concurring) (placing the burden of persuasion with respect to 
prejudice on the defendant, and noting that the defendant cannot satisfy 
this burden simply by pointing out that he did not receive the lowest 
possible sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines); Cole, 27 F.3d at 
999-1002 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (same). However , even these opinions 
are arguably incomplete, because they fail to address the possibility that 
the defendant might be explicitly relieved of the burden of proving 
prejudice when a trial court violates the right of allocution, and instead 
prejudice may be presumed. See infra  pp. 17-19. 
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[Sentencing] Guidelines minimum" sentence. Beckett, 208 
F.3d at 148. 
 
While the ultimate result in Beckett is sound, 
nevertheless our reasoning is somewhat cryptic due in part 
to its brevity. We did not mention Olano (or Johnson), nor 
did we use the term "plain error ," even though it is clear 
from the opinion that the defendant had raised no objection 
to the trial court's failure to observe the right of allocution 
at sentencing. And we did not refer to our earlier decision 
in Allegrucci -- in which we automatically vacated and 
remanded for resentencing based on a violation of the 
defendant's right of allocution -- and ther efore one could 
argue that our ruling in Beckett cr eates a conflict in our 
circuit precedent. 
 
Significantly, however, we do not consider Beckett as an 
improper departure from our cir cuit precedent in Allegrucci. 
In Beckett, we considered prejudice to the defendant rather 
than automatically remanding for resentencing. 
Accordingly, we view Beckett as r eflective of intervening 
Supreme Court case law (such as Olano and Johnson) that 
has highlighted the presence and importance of applying 
Rule 52 on direct appeal. As such, Beckett  has superceded 
Allegrucci. See, e.g., Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 
858 (3d Cir. 1996) (observing that "[a]lthough a panel of 
this court is bound by, and lacks authority to overrule, a 
published decision of a prior panel, a panel may r eevaluate 
a precedent in light of intervening authority and 
amendments to statutes or regulations"); see also Patterson 
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) 
(explaining that precedent may be overruled when 
intervening development of law has "weakened the 
conceptual underpinnings" of prior precedent). Still, we will 
attempt to flesh out what we did not specifically state in 
Beckett, and therefore we will analyze Adams' claim within 
the Olano plain error framework. 
 
Applying this framework, we first find, as explained 
above, that the District Court committed "err or" when it 
failed to personally address Adams prior to sentencing. In 
light of the District Court's clear duty to do so, e.g., Green, 
365 U.S. at 305, this error was "plain," because it was 
"clear" or "obvious," Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Next, we must 
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inquire whether this failure affected Adams' "substantial 
rights." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Nor mally, this would 
require Adams to show that the trial court's error was 
prejudicial, or in other words, that it"affected the outcome 
of the district court proceedings." Id.  
 
We note that this would be an onerous burden for Adams 
to meet. In order to prove that the err or actually "affected 
the outcome of the district court proceedings," Adams 
would have to point to statements that he would have made 
at sentencing, and somehow show that these statements 
would have changed the sentence imposed by the District 
Court. In this context, as the First Circuit observed in 
United States v. Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125 (1st Cir. 1994), 
"the impact of the omission on a [judge's] discretionary 
[sentencing] decision is usually enormously difficult to 
ascertain."9 Id. at 130. But as the Supreme Court explained 
in Olano, there may be some err ors "that should be 
presumed prejudicial if the defendant cannot make a 
specific showing of prejudice." Olano , 507 U.S. at 735. Thus 
the question for us becomes: should we presume prejudice 
when a district court violates a defendant's right of 
allocution? 
 
Given the nature of the right and the difficulty of proving 
prejudice from its violation, we conclude that we should 
presume prejudice when a defendant shows a violation of 
the right and the opportunity for such a violation to have 
played a role in the district court's sentencing decision. 
Adams has met that standard here. W e have, of course, 
already determined that his right of allocution was violated. 
And the opportunity existed for this violation to have played 
a role in the District Court's sentencing decision, because 
Adams was sentenced roughly in the middle of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. This "enormous difficulty" at least partially explains why several 
courts have implicitly presumed pr ejudice if the defendant has not 
received the lowest possible sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. 
E.g., United States v. Riascos-Suarez , 73 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Cole, 27 F.3d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Medrano, 5 F.3d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir . 1993). Without this presumption, 
defendants would face an uphill battle in their attempt to obtain relief 
for violations of the right of allocution -- a r esult that few courts 
have 
been willing to tolerate. 
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applicable Guidelines range, supra p. 3, and therefore the 
District Court clearly retained discretion to grant Adams a 
lower sentence. 
 
While this is the most obvious way in which the District 
Court retained discretion to give Adams a lower sentence, 
it is by no means the only way. For instance, the District 
Court also retained the discretion, had Adams spoken on 
his own behalf, to reconsider its rejection of defense 
counsel's earlier arguments against a two-level upward 
adjustment for making a threat during one of the bank 
robberies, against the criminal history category as over- 
representing Adams' criminal activity, and in favor of a 
downward departure based on substandar d confinement 
conditions. Moreover, as a general matter, we believe that 
the proper standard for us to follow is that an opportunity 
exists for a violation of the right of allocution to have played 
a role in the district court's sentencing decision -- even 
when a defendant is sentenced at the bottom of the 
Guidelines range thought to be applicable -- whenever a 
searching review of the district court r ecord reveals that 
there are any disputed facts at issue at sentencing, or any 
arguments raised in connection with sentencing, that if 
resolved in the defendant's favor would have r educed the 
applicable Guidelines range or the defendant's ultimate 
sentence.10 
 
Our conclusion that we should presume pr ejudice here, 
where Adams' right of allocution was violated, follows 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In adopting this standard, we explicitly reject the reasoning employed 
in United States v. Medrano, 5 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 1993), in which the 
Ninth Circuit engaged in open-ended speculation about what grounds for 
a lesser sentence the defendant might have ar gued to the trial court 
during his allocution had he been given the opportunity, even when such 
grounds had not been raised at any other point in the district court 
proceedings. Id. at 999. We think the better approach is that when the 
defendant is sentenced at the bottom of a Guidelines range, there is no 
opportunity for a violation of the right of allocution to have played a 
role 
in the district court's sentencing decision unless there were disputed 
facts actually at issue at sentencing, or ar guments made in connection 
with sentencing, that if resolved in the defendant's favor would have 
reduced the applicable Guidelines range or the defendant's ultimate 
sentence. 
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logically from Supreme Court precedent. As the Court 
explained in Green, the right of allocution is premised on 
the idea that "[t]he most persuasive counsel may not be 
able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with 
halting eloquence, speak for himself." Gr een, 365 U.S. at 
304. Thus, denying Adams his right of allocution was 
tantamount to denying him his most persuasive and 
eloquent advocate. And the District Court was likewise 
denied the opportunity to take into consideration Adams' 
unique perspective on the circumstances r elevant to his 
sentence, delivered by his own voice. In such a situation, 
we find it appropriate to presume pr ejudice because the 
sentencing process itself was render ed presumptively 
unreliable. See, e.g., id. at 304-05; cf., e.g., United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (observing that courts 
should presume prejudice when the adversary process itself 
has been rendered presumptively unr eliable). 
 
Furthermore, while the right of allocution is not 
constitutional, nonetheless it is ancient in origin, and it is 
the type of important safeguard that helps assure the 
fairness, and hence legitimacy, of the sentencing process. 
See, e.g., Green, 365 U.S. at 304-05; see also United States 
v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 463-64 (5th Cir . 1998) (observing 
that the practice of allowing a defendant to speak before 
sentencing has both functional and symbolic meaning that 
lends legitimacy to the sentencing process); Alba Pagan, 33 
F.3d at 129 (noting that the right of allocution "is designed 
to temper punishment with mercy in appr opriate cases, and 
to ensure that sentencing reflects individualized 
circumstances," and that the right "has value in terms of 
maximizing the perceived equity of the pr ocess"). When this 
legitimacy is called into question -- as it was when the 
District Court did not personally address Adams and 
inquire if he wished to speak on his own behalf-- prejudice 
presumptively follows. 
 
Finally, having concluded that the forfeited error in this 
case "affects substantial rights," we must address the last 
prong of the Olano framework. W e should exercise our 
discretion to correct the District Court's error only if it 
"seriously affect[s] the fair ness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 736. 
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As explained above, the legitimacy of the sentencing 
process was called into question when Adams' right of 
allocution was violated. Moreover, a defendant's allocution 
plays a crucial part in the sentencing process, and thus a 
denial of this right is not the sort of "isolat[ed]" or "abstract" 
error that we might determine does not impact the 
"fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings." Young, 470 U.S. at 15-16. Therefore, we have 
little difficulty concluding that it is appr opriate for us to 
exercise our discretionary authority to correct the error in 
this case, and that Adams must be resentenced. 
 
In sum, we hold that the District Court committed plain 
error that should be corrected when it failed to personally 
address Adams prior to sentencing, in violation of Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(C). Adams need not 
point to specific prejudice resulting fr om the District 
Court's error, because here we consider the trial court's 
violation of Rule 32(c)(3)(C) as one of those situations in 
which prejudice should be presumed. Mor eover, as a 
general matter, we conclude that prejudice should be 
presumed whenever the opportunity exists for this violation 
to have played a role in the district court's sentencing 
decision. Our resolution of this case follows naturally from 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and is consistent with our 
previous ruling in Beckett. 
 
In accordance with the foregoing, the judgment of 
conviction and sentence of the District Court enter ed on 
March 17, 2000, will be vacated and the case r emanded for 
resentencing. 
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